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ABSTRACT
Functional Discourse Grammar (FDG) is a typologically-based theory of 
language structure which is organized in levels, layers and components. 
In this paper, I will claim that FDG is modular in Sadock’s sense, as it 
presents four independent levels of representation with their own linguistic 
primitives each. For modular grammars, the relation between the different 
levels (more technically, the nature of the interfaces) is a central issue. 
It will be shown that FDG is a top-down grammar which follows two 
basic principles in its dynamic implementation: Depth-ﬁ rst and Maximal 
depth. Together with external constraints, these principles conspire to 
create linguistic representations which are psychologically adequate 
and which allow levels to be circumvented if necessary, thus simplifying 
representations and creating mismatches among them.
Key-words: Functional Discourse Grammar; modularity; mismatch; 
derivation.
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RESUMO
A Gramática Discursivo-Funcional (GDF) é uma teoria tipologicamente 
fundamentada da estrutura linguística organizada em níveis, camadas 
e componentes. Neste trabalho, defendo que a GDF é uma teoria 
modular no sentido proposto por Sadock, uma vez que apresenta quatro 
níveis independentes de representação, cada qual com seus primitivos 
linguísticos. Nas gramáticas modulares, a relação entre os diferentes 
níveis (mais especiﬁ camente, a natureza das interfaces) é uma questão 
central. Assim, pretendo demonstrar que a GDF é uma gramática 
descendente que segue dois princípios básicos para sua implementação 
dinâmica: profundidade primeiro e profundidade máxima. Juntamente a 
restrições externas, esses princípios colaboram para criar representações 
linguísticas que são psicologicamente adequadas e possibilitam evitar 
níveis se necessário, simpliﬁ cando as representações e permitindo seu 
não alinhamento.
Palavras-chave: Gramática Discursivo-Funcional; modularidade; não 
alinhamento; derivação.
1. Introduction1
Sadock (2012: 4) formulates the Modularity of Grammar 
Hypothesis, which states that “grammatical rules of different 
informational types do not interact”. Grammars which comply with 
this principle are modular sensu stricto, since they are organized 
in independent generative systems which offer different linguistic 
representations (i.e. semantic, syntactic, phonological, etc.) for a given 
linguistic expression.
Non-modular theories may also contain different levels of linguistic 
analysis, but, crucially, they are not independent, as key aspects of one 
may be derived from the application of principles pertaining to another. 
Sadock (2012: 7) further argues that, apart from his own Autolexical 
Syntax, Jackendoff’s Parallel Architecture is “the only one […] 
framework I am aware of” that is also modular in that sense. 
1. I am grateful to two anonymous reviewers for useful comments and suggestions.
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Functional Discourse Grammar (FDG; Hengeveld and Mackenzie 
2008) is a typologically-based theory of language structure which is 
organized in levels, layers and components. In this paper, I will claim 
that FDG is also modular in Sadock’s sense, as it is organized in four 
independent levels of representation with their own linguistic primitives 
each. For modular grammars, the relation between the different levels 
(more technically, the nature of the interfaces) is a central issue. It will 
be shown that FDG is a top-down grammar which follows two basic 
principles in its dynamic implementation: depth ﬁ rst and maximal 
depth. These two principles conspire to create linguistic representations 
which are psychologically adequate and which allow levels to be 
circumvented if necessary, thus simplifying representations and creating 
mismatches among them (Contreras-García 2013).
This article is organized as follows. In section 2 I present a brief 
characterization of the architecture of Functional Discourse Grammar, 
with special reference to those aspects which will be relevant in the 
present discussion. Section 3 centres on the notion of modularity and 
the different interpretations it has received in the linguistic literature. 
Section 4 argues that FDG is a modular grammar in Sadock’s sense, 
but also notes a crucial difference with both Autolexical Syntax and 
the Parallel Architecture, namely, the fact that FDG is a directional 
grammar. Finally, section 5 examines several linguistic phenomena in 
FDG terms and shows how its directional modular architecture works 
in analytical practice.
2. Functional Discourse Grammar: general architecture
FDG is committed to the analysis of language from a functional 
perspective and therefore views language as an instrument of social 
interaction which must be studied within the context of the strategies 
which govern its communicative function. In the architecture of the 
theory, the functionalist stance is reﬂ ected in the top-down orientation 
of the model and in taking the Discourse Act (DA) as the basic unit 
of analysis, which is deﬁ ned as “the smallest identiﬁ able units of 
communicative behaviour” (Kroon 1997: 20). It is important to stress 
that DAs do not correspond to a particular structural unit, as fully 
communicative utterances may consist of fragments of different sorts. 
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This makes the sentence or the clause an inadequate basic unit of 
linguistic analysis. 
This top-down directionality is also a reﬂ ection of the theory’s 
commitment to cognitive adequacy and was strongly inspired by the 
psycholinguistic research of Levelt (1989). Figure 1 offers the general 
organization of FDG (Hengeveld and Mackenzie 2008: 13).
Figure 1 – FDG: general organization.
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The rectangles in ﬁ gure 1 indicate the levels of representation 
which are produced by the different processes, as represented by ovals. 
The ovals indicate the operations of Formulation and Encoding in the 
creation of a linguistic expression. Formulation is the process by means 
of which pragmatic and semantic representations are produced; at the 
two encoding stages morphosyntactic and phonological representations 
are created. The boxes on the left of the ﬁ gure contain the primitives 
which are employed by the different operations. Each operation has its 
own set of primitives in the form of frames, templates and operators 
(among others). 
It should be noted, however, that ﬁ gure 1 presents a complete 
theory of verbal interaction of which FDG constitutes the grammatical 
component. Hence, the three adjacent components, the Conceptual, 
Contextual and the Output components, are not part of FDG proper, 
but are included in the theory in the belief that certain grammatical 
processes can be best explained if reference is made to these 
components. The Contextual Component represents the speech situation 
and includes both linguistic and non-linguistic perceptual information. 
The Conceptual Component is responsible for the creation of a 
communicative intention which will be translated through the process 
of Formulation into relevant representations at the Interpersonal and 
Representational Levels. Finally, the Output Component is responsible 
for the actual execution of a linguistic expression through the operation 
of articulation. Note that this articulation may be of different kinds 
(written, signed or spoken), depending on the medium of expression 
chosen.
The grammar component in Figure 1 posits four levels of 
representation: the Representational Level (RL), the Interpersonal 
Level (IL), the Morphosyntactic Level (ML) and the Phonological level 
(PL). These four levels of representation are independently organized 
but are related to one another, as indicated by the relevant arrows. The 
correspondence between the levels and the main areas of linguistic 
analysis is given in (1):
(1) Pragmatics → Interpersonal Level
 Semantics → Representational Level
 Morphosyntax → Morphosyntactic Level
 Phonology → Phonological Level
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Each level is hierarchically organized: the theory posits a number 
of layers at each level which account for the differences in scope among 
linguistic units. The general format for the hierarchical organization of 
layers is shown in (2) (Hengeveld and Mackenzie 2008: 14):
(2) (π1 v1: [head (v1) Φ]: [σ (v1) Φ])Φ
In this general schema, ‘v’ stands for the relevant variable at each 
layer, which can be restricted by one head taking that variable as its 
argument. The head itself may be rather complex, thus giving rise to 
more elaborate representations. This construction may be modiﬁ ed 
by operators (π) and satellites (σ), which symbolize grammatical and 
lexical modiﬁ ers respectively. Given the lexical nature of satellites, 
these can also take arguments, in this case the variable of the relevant 
layer. Finally, ‘Φ’ represents the function (syntactic, pragmatic or 
semantic) which a given unit realizes.
As an illustration of an FDG analysis, consider the following 
example from Hengeveld and Mackenzie (2008: 23):
(3) (I like) these bananas.
 a. IL (+id RI)
 b. RL (prox m xi: [(fi: /bə’na:nə/N(fi)) (xi) ])
 c. ML (Npi: [(Gwi: this-pl(Gwi)) (Nwi: / bə’na:nə /-pl (Nwi))] (Npi))
 d. PL (PPi: [(Pwi: /i:z/ (Pwi)) (Pwj: / bə’na:nəz/ (Pwj))] (PPi))
At the Interpersonal Level (IL) “these bananas” is analysed as a 
referential unit (R) which is assumed to be identiﬁ able (+id) by the 
Addressee. The Representational Level (RL) captures the fact that the 
phrase designates more than one entity (m) of the Individual type (x), 
which is described as having the property (f). An operator of proximity 
(prox) indicates the location of the entities with respect to the deictic 
centre. At the Morphosyntactic Level (ML) the constituent is analysed 
as a Noun Phrase (Np) consisting of a Grammatical Word (Gw) and 
a Nominal Word (Nw) as head. At the Phonological Level (PL) the 
appropriate plural forms of the Words are provided.
Once the basic properties of FDG have been introduced, I now 
turn to examining the notion of modularity in linguistics in order to 
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evaluate if it can be adequately applied to Hengeveld and Mackenzie’s 
model.
3. What do we mean by modularity?
There are at least two senses of modularity which are relevant in the 
linguistic literature. On the one hand, the grammar component may be 
seen as an autonomous system whose working principles are independent 
of those relevant in other cognitive components. This provides a view 
of the human mind as a modular object, and consequently argues for 
an interpretation of linguistic competence as a speciﬁ c object non-
reducible to other existing capacities. This perspective is inspired in 
Fodor’s (1983) inﬂ uential work The Modularity of Mind in which he 
argued that independent modules are deﬁ ned, among others, by the 
following essential properties:
• Domain speciﬁ city: modules only operate on certain kinds of 
inputs–they are specialised.
• Informational encapsulation: modules need not refer to other 
psychological systems in order to operate.
The modularity of the mind hypothesis is fully consistent with the 
Chomskyan view on language, in which the grammar is autonomous 
as its organizational principles and properties are in no signiﬁ cant 
way derived from semantic and/or pragmatic principles. As noted by 
Newmeyer (1998), formalist models which accept the autonomy of 
syntax hypothesis also accept the autonomy of grammar by deﬁ nition, 
and thus the existence of a specialized linguistic mental module is a 
natural conclusion.
Cognitive-functional models, by contrast, tend to adopt an 
integrative approach and typically reject the modularity of the 
mind hypothesis. Consider the following quote from Langacker 
(1987: 13):
Language is an integral part of human cognition. An account of linguistic 
structure should therefore articulate with what is known about cognitive 
processing in general, regardless of whether one posits a special language 
“module” (Fodor 1983). If such a faculty exists, it is nevertheless embedded 
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in the general psychological matrix, for it represents the evolution and 
ﬁ xation of structures having a less specialized origin. (…) Thus we have no 
valid reason to anticipate a sharp dichotomy between linguistic ability and 
other aspects of cognitive processing.
However, it is certainly possible to accept the autonomy of 
grammar without accepting the autonomy of the syntax component 
(within grammar), so it is not the case that all functional models reject 
the modularity of the mind downright. Newmeyer (1998: 25) cites Van 
Valin’s Role and Reference Grammar and Dik’s Functional Grammar as 
such theories, given that they propose a “semiotic system (…) in which 
there is no clear separation of semantic and syntactic primitives”.
As mentioned earlier, FDG is deﬁ ned as the grammatical component 
of a wider theory of verbal interaction. The outer components 
(Contextual, Conceptual and Output) are non-linguistic, that is, they 
do NOT belong to FDG proper. Consequently, FDG seems to assume 
that grammar is an independent module or at least the theory remains 
agnostic about the issue.
A second sense of modularity pertains to the organization of 
grammar in independent internal components, which can be seen 
as autonomous objects within the entire grammatical system. This 
interpretation of modularity is explicitly formulated by Sadock (2012: 
4) with the following principle which deﬁ nes the fundamental property 
of a modular grammar architecture:
The Modularity of Grammar Hypothesis
Grammatical rules of different informational types do not 
interact.
Sadock himself notes that “[t]his extends Jerry Fodor’s (1983) 
modularity of mind hypothesis to one of his modules: the language 
faculty.”
According to Sadock, then, the essence of a modular grammar 
is that it should provide a set of independent representations for each 
linguistic expression. Two extant models, Jackendoff’s (1997, 2002) 
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Parallel Architecture (ﬁ rst named Representational Modularity), and 
Sadock’s (2012) Autolexical Syntax, adopt this architecture. Both 
Jackendoff and Sadock agree that phonology, syntax and semantics are 
independent generative systems. In the words of Jackendoff (1997: 40):
Representational Modularity therefore posits that the architecture of the 
mind/brain devotes separate modules to these two encodings. Each of these 
modules is domain-speciﬁ c (phonology and syntax respectively); and (…) 
each is informationally encapsulated in Fodor’s (1983) sense.
Additionally, Jackendoff (1997: 38) claims that interface modules 
are crucially needed to check the compatibility of the parallel 
representations.
We can regard a full grammatical derivation, then, as three independent and 
parallel derivations, one in each component, with the derivations imposing 
mutual constraints through the interfaces.
According to Sadock, if a grammatical theory has an interpretive 
component in its architecture, it violates The Modularity of Grammar 
Hypothesis given that the operation of one level of representation 
depends on the previous construction of another. This is the case of 
Government and Binding theory as presented in Chomsky (1981), 
whose general architecture is given in Figure 2:
Figure 2 – Government and Binding Theory.
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In this model, Phonetic Form (PF) and Logical Form (LF) are 
interpretive components which operate on previously constructed 
syntactic representations. Logical Form cannot operate without the 
previous speciﬁ cation of a syntactic representation and, what is more, 
the semantic interpretation that LF contributes to the sentence crucially 
relies on the position of constituents in that syntactic representation.
However, as Escribano (1992) notes, any grammatical theory is 
modular to some extent, since they all propose the existence of levels 
and components which, in different ways, deal with the main areas of 
linguistic analysis (syntax, semantics, etc.). The key factor in his view 
lies in the nature of the interaction between the modules proposed. On the 
one hand, theories which do not conform to the Modularity Hypothesis 
typically show a relation between modules which is destructive, whereas 
in modular grammars the relation between components is cooperative. 
In Government and Binding Theory, for example, different subtheories 
combine to guarantee the grammaticality of the derivation, which 
allows one of them to overgenerate as long as the rest of them conspire 
to eliminate ill-formed representations. Figure 2 shows the different 
sub-theories within GB which impose restrictions on GB derivations. 
Unlike Sadock, Escribano views this strategy as truly modular given 
that the different subtheories interact multidimensionally. Models 
in which modules generate parallel representations are deﬁ ned by 
Escribano as “grammars of components”. 
One consequence of the multidimensional relation between modules 
is that grammars become more abstract given that the principles they 
formulate apply to subcomponents whose representations are more 
distant from observable linguistic forms. The beneﬁ t of this strategy, in 
Escribano’s opinion, is that these grammars are more versatile, natural 
and learnable. The advantage of grammars of components, in turn, is 
that they produce representations which are simpler and more faithful 
to actual observable facts. Sadock (2012: 7) adds the following three 
advantages of the Modularity Hypothesis:
(i) Formalizability
Given that each component or module deals with a different type 
of information, each representation becomes simpler, which results in 
an overall simpliﬁ cation of linguistic analyses.
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(ii) Concreteness
The facts described by each component are observable, or can be 
conﬁ rmed from intuition (see discussion on Escribano 1992 above).
(iii) Plausibility
A modular approach to grammar is arguably more attractive  with 
respect to psychological adequacy. This is also explicitly advocated by 
Jackendoff (2002: 196), who claims that “the parallel architecture offers 
a theoretical perspective that uniﬁ es linguistics with psycholinguistics 
more satisfactorily than has been previously possible.” 
In the following section, I will examine the extent to which FDG can 
be considered a modular grammar as characterized in this section. 
4. FDG as a modular grammar
In this section, I examine the extent to which FDG complies with 
Sadock’s Modularity Hypothesis and, in particular, whether the FDG 
architecture is indeed motivated by the desire to meet the advantages 
which Sadock attributes to modular grammars.
As far as formalizability is concerned, it is probably right to say 
that each of the four levels of representation that FDG poses deals with 
its own type of information. The coincidence with Sadock’s approach 
to grammar is explicitly acknowledged by Hengeveld and Mackenzie 
(2008: 31) who claim that Autolexical Syntax shares “our rejection 
of a derivational model, our commitment to multiple orthogonal 
representations of linguistic phenomena, and our interest in mismatches 
between the levels”. In other words, by rejecting a derivational model, 
Hengeveld and Mackenzie reject the possibility of levels being derived 
from one another and hence implicitly argue for the independence of 
representations. The existence of autonomous levels thus allows for the 
creation of mismatches between representations. Consequently, each 
level of representation operates with information and units of its own 
type and cannot affect information from other levels. This is particularly 
obvious in the distinction between Formulation and Encoding (see 
section 2). Formulation refers to the process by which relevant semantic 
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and pragmatic representations are constructed, whereas Encoding 
relates to the conversion of those into relevant Morphosyntactic and 
Phonological representations. By deﬁ nition encoding operations cannot 
change the semantic and pragmatic properties of expressions, as their 
role in the grammar is the mere codiﬁ cation of those. As Hengeveld 
and Mackenzie (2008: 282) observe:
To some considerable extent, the Morphosyntactic Level is dependent on its 
input: the input structures provide information to which the Morphosyntactic 
Level applies its own principles of organization. It must pass on to the 
Phonological Level an exact coverage of that information, such that an 
interpreter will be able to reconstruct the input structures exactly. In other 
words the Morphosyntactic Level cannot add or subtract semantic or 
pragmatic information.
The independence of levels relevant at Formulation from those 
relevant at Encoding would seem intuitively obvious, but the autonomy 
of semantic and pragmatic representations within Formulation requires 
further argumentation. Hengeveld and Mackenzie (2008: 16) use the 
following example to illustrate the issue:
(4) a. Sheila is my best friend.
  (Ascription of Individual entity: T/x)
 b. My best friend visited me last night.
  (Reference to Individual: R/x)
The examples in (4) show that the same semantic unit can be used 
in two different interpersonal functions, Ascription and Reference. The 
authors conclude that “[e]xamples like these show that, though there 
are regular correspondences between the Interpersonal Level and the 
Representational Level, the two are basically independent of each other, 
allowing for a wide variety of interactions between them.”
Hengeveld and Mackenzie further argue that the postulation of four 
levels of linguistic analysis allows the anaphoric reference to linguistic 
information of the four different kinds, which again justiﬁ es the analysis 
of linguistic expressions in terms of independent representations 
(Hengeveld and Mackenzie 2008: 5).
The notion of “concreteness” in FDG should be understood 
within the context of the theory’s interest in meeting the standard of 
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psychological adequacy, which also motivates the general top-down 
architecture of the model. In various passages throughout their book, 
the authors emphasize that the different levels of representations are 
linguistic in nature in that they reﬂ ect functions and units which are 
linguistically encoded in the grammar of languages. This, by deﬁ nition, 
serves to keep analytical abstraction to the minimum required in 
linguistic description. 
In Functional Grammar, Dik (1997: 18) had warned against what 
he deﬁ ned as a “non-empirical attitude towards linguistic analysis” in 
which it is implicitly assumed that languages are imperfect objects that 
conceal rather than reveal linguistic structure. Observable differences 
in languages should be analysed from the starting point that they have 
some functionality in the system and not from the perspective that they 
can be reduced to pre-established categories at some abstract level of 
representation.
Hengeveld and Mackenzie (2008: 40-41) explicitly follow this 
approach:
A further crucial aspect of FDG methodology, inherited from its predecessor 
FG, is that it constrains potential analyses of linguistic phenomena to those 
that do not involve the postulation of transformations and ﬁ lters. (…) These 
two restrictions ensure that no underlying structures arise that are later 
discarded (…) in this way underlying structures are ‘recoverable from their 
outward manifestations’ (Dik 1997a: 23).
Indeed, as a non-derivational theory, FDG does not postulate the 
existence of hidden-levels of analysis (Jackendoff and Culicover 2005), 
empty categories, or destructive operations like ﬁ lters (Dik 1997: 21). 
In García Velasco et al (2012: 496) we read:
[FDG] has championed a wysiwyg [what you see is what you get] view of 
linguistic structure according to which a Linguistic Expression can consist 
of one or more elements of any unit at the ML and expresses IL and RL 
representations which do not contain more information than is justiﬁ ed by 
the actual form under analysis.
Finally, Sadock’s notion of “plausibility” is directly touched upon 
by Mackenzie (2012: 422): “A distinctive advance in the architecture of 
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FDG is a quite explicit attempt to construct a theory that plausibly lines 
up with work in the psycholinguistics of language production (…).” 
As discussed in section 2, FDG is inspired by the psycholinguistic 
work of Level (1989). Levelt himself notes that processing components 
are ‘relatively autonomous specialists’ in that “a component’s input is 
of maximally restricted sort” and “a component’s mode of operation 
is minimally affected by the output of other components”. Levelt 
matches these restrictions with Fodor’s (1983) notion of ‘information 
encapsulation’, which again provides indirect evidence to view FDG’s 
levels of representation as autonomous entities.
It would thus seem that the advantages Sadock attributes to modular 
grammars are in different ways reﬂ ected in the FDG architecture and 
underlie the motivation that led to the postulation of the theory. However, 
there is one signiﬁ cant difference between FDG on the one hand and 
Sadock’s Autolexical Syntax and Jackendoff’s Parallel Architecture 
on the other. This relates to the notion of “directionality”. FDG, it 
has been said, is a non-derivational grammar, but it has a top-down 
orientation. Escribano (1992) notes that directionality is a key notion 
to distinguishing modular from non-modular grammars. If a modular 
grammar (or grammar of components in his terminology) is one in 
which different modules interact massively, directionality imposes 
a restriction on those interactions since by deﬁ nition it presupposes 
that one module cannot operate until another module, previous in the 
implementation, has been constructed. Indeed, in FDG, the operation of 
Encoding necessarily operates after Formulation processes have taken 
place (but see section 5). This constrasts with the situation we ﬁ nd in 
the PA. Consider the following quote from Jackendoff (2002: 198):
The parallel constrained-based architecture is logically non-directional: 
one can start with any piece of structure in any component and pass along 
logical pathways provided by the constraints to construct a coherent larger 
structure around it. (…) Because the grammar is logically non-directional, 
it is not inherently biased toward either perception or production –unlike the 
syntactocentric architecture, which is inherently biased against both!
It could thus be argued that FDG’s encoding levels (Morphosyntax and 
Phonology) are interpretive in the weak sense that they require formulation 
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levels be speciﬁ ed in order to operate. This gives the possibilities illustrated 
in table 1 for the models discussed in this work.
Table 1 – Modularity and directionality in four grammars
Modular Directional Interpretive modules Destructive interaction
AS + - - -
PA + - - -
FDG + + + -
GB - + + +
As table 1 indicates, FDG shares with AS and PA its compatibility 
with Sadock’s Modularity Hypothesis, but it differs in that its top-down 
directionality makes models not fully independent in the dynamic 
implementation of the grammar. This is the issue to which I turn in 
the following section.
5. The Dynamic implementation of FDG: Mismatches
Although FDG is presented as a model of encoded patterns and 
intentions, the theory also holds that the grammar is implemented 
dynamically. This, however, does not mean that the grammar should 
be seen as a process model, but, as discussed by Mackenzie (2014: 
251), as a reﬂ ection of the dynamic sequence of steps taken by the 
analyst in order to “clarify the logic of the relations among the layers, 
levels and components and not to mimic the sequence in the real time 
of language production”. There are two principles which operate in 
this dynamic interpretation of FDG analytical practice and which are 
relevant to understanding the relation among the different levels of 
representations. These are the principles of Depth-ﬁ rst and Maximal 
depth, which are deﬁ ned as follows: 
• Depth-ﬁ rst: “Information from a certain level is sent down to a lower level 
as soon as the necessary input for that lower level is complete” (Hengeveld 
and Mackenzie 2008: 24).
The rationale behind this principle is that it is probably not realistic 
to assume that the grammar creates or speciﬁ es levels of representation 
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orderly such that one level can not start being constructed until another 
one has been fully speciﬁ ed.
• Maximal depth: “The principle of maximal depth states that only those 
levels of representation that are relevant for the build-up of (a certain aspect 
of) an utterance are used in the production of that (aspect of the) utterance 
[…] It avoids the vacuous speciﬁ cation of levels of representation that 
are irrelevant to the production of the utterance at hand”. (Hengeveld and 
Mackenzie 2008: 25)
Ideally, the relations between levels should be isomorphic, so that 
one unit at a given level correlates with another one at each of the rest of 
levels. Indeed, there are default relations between layers across levels, 
as in, for example, the tendency for a Discourse Act to correspond to 
a State-of-Affairs at RL, a Clause at ML and an Intonational Phrase at 
PL. The principle of maximal depth, however, states that it is possible 
to have representations for linguistic utterances in which some levels 
are not activated (see below).
Additionally, the relations among levels may be affected by 
external constraints. Hengeveld and Mackenzie (2008: 283) discuss 
the relation between the Interpersonal and Representational Levels and 
the Morphosyntactic Level. This relation is governed by three general 
principles: Iconicity, Domain Integrity and Functional stability.
Iconicity is deﬁ ned by Newmeyer (1998: 114) as “the idea that the 
form, length, complexity, or interrelationship of elements in a linguistic 
representation reﬂ ects the form, length, complexity or interrelationship 
of elements in the concept, experience or communicative strategy that 
that the representation encodes”.
There are different ways in which iconicity manifests itself in 
linguistic structure, but the most obvious is probably the tendency for 
clauses to be juxtaposed in accordance with the chronological order 
of the events they portray. The following example, taken from the 
advertising campaign for the ﬁ lm “Green card”, purposely produces 
an anomalous effect since the order of the clauses does not meet the 
expected order of events in real life:
(5) The story of two people who got married, met and then fell in love
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Domain Integrity is formulated in Dik (1997: 402) as follows:
The Principle of Domain Integrity 
Constituents prefer to remain within their proper domain: domains 
prefer not to be interrupted by constituents from other domains.
In FDG terms, this principle entails that units that belong together 
at the IL and RL will tend to be “juxtaposed to one another at the 
Morphosyntactic Level” (Hengeveld and Mackenzie 2008: 283). 
Consider the following English examples:
(6) a. a suitable actor
 b. an actor suitable for the part 
 c. *a suitable for the part actor 
In (6a) the modiﬁ er ‘suitable’ appears next to the head noun it 
modiﬁ es. There is thus a direct correspondence between the RL and the 
ML in this example and Domain Integrity is respected. In (6b) ‘suitable’ 
is modiﬁ ed by the PP “for the part” and this complex adjectival phrase 
is placed postnominally. This ensures that Domain Integrity is respected 
in both domains (the Np and the Ap). The ungrammaticality of (6c) is 
therefore due to the interruption of the Np, as the adjective is separated 
from the noun it modiﬁ es.
The principle of Functional Stability is characterized as “the 
requirement that constituents with the same specification, be it 
interpersonal or representational, be placed in the same position relative 
to other categories.” (Hengeveld and Mackenzie (2008: 286)
These three principles contribute to the notion of grammatical 
transparency which is characterized as follows (García Velasco et al. 
2012: 494):
Transparency is a variable property of languages or subsystems of languages. 
Complete transparency is present when, in an FDG analysis, there are one-to-
one (or biunique) relations between the component parts of each of the four 
levels. (…) Nevertheless, in actual fact, languages tend to display various 
degrees of non-transparency or opacity for various reasons. For example, 
dummy elements introduced at the ML (such as the existential marker there 
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in English or the dummy auxiliary izan in Basque) reduce the transparency 
of the relation between ML and the formulation levels, since the elements 
in question have no meaning and therefore correspond to nothing at the IL 
or the RL.
In other words, when transparency is not respected, the system 
produces a mismatch between the levels of representation. This is a 
crucial question in the implementation of the theory, as Hengeveld and 
Mackenzie (2008: 42) themselves note:
Of particular interest for the further advancement of FDG will be future 
studies on the interface issue, the question of how best to connect the four 
concurrent representations that characterize the current model. It is to be 
expected that mismatches across the various levels will be of particular 
importance in this enterprise.
A recent contribution to this question is to be found in the work of 
Contreras-García (2013: 87), who deﬁ nes a mismatch in the following 
way: “A mismatch arises if the same linguistic element is represented 
across levels in such a way that a non-isomorphic relation is to be 
seen.”
A mismatch then involves a ‘discrepancy’ between levels and 
contributes to a non-transparent relation between them. In the present 
context, it is crucial to note that for a mismatch to arise, levels 
necessarily have to be autonomous, which supports the view that FDG 
is a modular grammar in Sadock’s sense. From the previous discussion, 
it can be proposed that there are, at least, two types of mismatches in 
FDG: (i) unnecessary levels and (ii) non-biunique relations across 
levels.
As for levels, the principle of Maximal depth discussed above 
entails that levels may not be activated if they are unnecessary in 
the analysis of a particular expression. This means that information 
from one level of representation may not ﬁ nd a direct correlate in 
another level. It is difﬁ cult to think of a linguistic expression in 
which one encoding level does not contain any information at all 
given that an addressee would always need some linguistic form to 
decode a communicative act. However, it is possible to have linguistic 
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expressions with no semantic content but with a communicative or 
interpersonal value only. This is the case of expressives and interactives 
as in the following examples:
(7) Ouch! 
 (AI: [(FI: /aƓtƌ/Int (FI)) (PI)S] (AI))
 Congratulations! 
 (AI: [(FI: /kəŋgrætjuleųƌnz/(FI)) (PI)S (Pj)A] (AI))
These expressions serve a communicative function, but do not 
convey literal or denotational meaning of the kind that is captured at 
the RL. Therefore, the IL as represented in (7) circumvents both the 
RL and the ML and is directly linked to the Phonological Level.
Non-biunique relations across levels form a second type of 
mismatch, which relates to the existence of a unit at one level which 
does not ﬁ nd a direct correlate at another level of representation. 
Consider the following example:
(8) We’ve seen him
At the ML, we ﬁ nd the following representation, in which each 
lexical unit is analysed independently:
(9) (Cli: [(Npi: we (Npi)) (Vpi: [(Gwi: have (Gwi))
 (Vwi: seen (Vwi))] (Vpi)) (Npi: him (Npi))] (Cli)
However, in actual speech, it is natural to pronounce the entire 
sequence as one phonological unit. This is represented in (10) in which 
(8) appears as one Phonological word (Pw):
(10) (Ui: [ (Pwi: wųv’si:nųm (Pwi)) ] (Ui)
Consequently, morphosyntactic units such as Np, Vp, etc. in (9) 
are not reﬂ ected in a corresponding phonological unit in (10).
Another case which illustrates this issue concerns the analysis 
of compounding in English. A sequence like, say, ‘coffee maker’ is 
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analysed at the RL as the combination of two lexical properties ‘make’ 
and ‘coffee’ within one individual ‘x’ frame. The entire unit would 
correspond to a Nominal word (Nw), but the lexical properties do not 
ﬁ nd a corresponding unit at ML. This is represented in (11):
(11) a. RL: (xi: (fi: [(fj: make (fj)) (xj: -coffee- (xj))U] (fi)) (xi))
 b. ML: (Nwi: -coffee maker- (Nwi))
A more complex case of structural mismatch is illustrated by the 
phenomenon called raising, which is studied within the context of FDG 
in García Velasco (2013). As an example of Subject-to-Subject raising, 
consider the following case:
(12) a. It seems that the children are allergic to something
 b. The children seem to be allergic to something
The italicized subject of the embedded clause in (12a) takes on 
subject function of the matrix clause in (12b), and the embedded clause 
becomes inﬁ nitival. Morphosyntactically, the children behaves as the 
subject of seem, as shown by the fact that both agree in number and that 
this Np takes preverbal position, which in English is usually reserved 
for subjects. Semantically, however, it is an argument of the embedded 
predicate, as it is the predication to be allergic to something that imposes 
semantic restrictions (e.g. <+animate>) on the displaced subject. At 
the RL, therefore, it is assumed that both expressions present the same 
analysis (representations are given in simpliﬁ ed form):
(13) (pi: [(Pres epi: [ (ei: [(fk: [(fi: seem (fi)) 
 (pj: -the children are allergic …- (pj))] (fk))] (ei)) ] (epi))] (pi))
However, at the Morphosyntactic Level there is a structural 
mismatch as in (12b), ‘the children’, a unit which belongs into the 
embedded proposition at the RL, is now placed in a position external 
to the corresponding Clause (Clj), as shown in (14): 
(14) (Cli: [ (Npi: -the children- (Npi)) (Vpi: seem (Vpi)) 
 (Clj: -to be allergic…- (Clj)] (Cli))
Raising is an extremely complex phenomenon in which different 
types of information from different dimensions interact in delicate 
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ways. This complexity can be illustrated with the situation in the 
Spanish language. Initially, Subject raising in Spanish would seem 
to show a pattern similar to the English one. Thus, the examples in 
(15) would receive a parallel analysis to those of the English examples 
in (12):
(15) a. Parece que      los profesores  beben  vino
  Seem.PRS.3SG that      the teacher.PL   drink.PRS.3PL wine
  ‘It seems that the teachers drink wine’
 b. Los  profesores parecen       beber         vino
  The  teacher.PL seem.PRS.3PL     drink.INF   wine
  ‘The teachers seem to drink wine’
However, the language shows one additional possibility, illustrated 
in example (16):
(16) Los profesores parece  que    beben        vino
 The teacher.PL seem.PRS.3SG that    drink.PRS.3PL    wine
 ‘The teachers seem to drink wine’
In (16) the subject of the embedded clause (‘los profesores’) 
takes sentence-initial position, but it still agrees with the verb in the 
embedded domain. The displaced Np and the rest of the expression 
are not separated by an intonation break, which is taken by Dik (1981: 
176ff.) as evidence against a left-dislocation analysis for parallel 
examples in European Portuguese. What we thus seem to have here 
is a mismatch between the ML and the PL. Under the assumption that 
the displaced Np is phonologically integrated within the main clause, 
the representation proposed consists of one Utterance (U) containing 
just one Intonational Phrase (IP):
(17) ((Ui: (IPi: / los profesores parece que beben vinoIPi)) (Ui))
However, at the ML, the raised Np is placed outside the main 
clause, as it is not morphosyntactically integrated in it, but it appears 
within the same linguistic expression (Le).
(18) (Lei: [(Npi: -los profesores- (Npi))
 (Cli: -parece que beben vino- (Cli))] (Lei)
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This contrasts with the analysis shown in (14) in which the 
displaced Np is integrated in the main clause, given that it agrees with 
the main verb.
6. Conclusion
In this paper, I have examined the architectural organization of 
Functional Discourse Grammar in the light of Sadock’s Modularity 
Hypothesis. I have claimed that FDG offers a modular architecture 
which is motivated by the desire to meet psychological plausibility 
and a self-imposed restriction on the degree of abstraction necessary 
in linguistic analysis. A crucial difference between FDG and other 
modular approaches, however, relates to the notion of directionality; 
whereas models such as Jackendoff’s Parallel Architecture are explicitly 
described as non-directional, FDG is a top-down grammar, which 
necessarily implies that certain modules (encoding levels) cannot 
operate until pragmatic and/or semantic representations have been 
formulated.
A natural consequence of the modular organization of FDG is 
the existence of discrepancies or mismatches between the levels of 
representation. In the dynamic implementation of the theory this is 
also a consequence of the principle of Maximal depth and the complex 
interaction of external constraints like Iconicity, Domain Integrity and 
Functional Stability.
Recebido em novembro de 2014
Aprovado em setembro de 2015
E-mail: danielg@uniovi.es
References
CHOMSKY, Noam. 1981. Lectures on Government and Binding. Dordrecht: 
Foris.
CONTRERAS-GARCÍA, Lucía. 2013. Grammar in 3D. On linguistic Theory 
Design. Ph. D. Diss. University of Amsterdam.
DIK, Simon C. 1981. The interaction of Subject and Topic in Portuguese. 
In: Bolkestein, A.M., Combé, H. A., Dik, S. C., Groot, Casper de, 
 Brasil-paraíso: estereótipo e circulação
23
33.1
2017 Modularity and derivation in Functional Discourse Grammar
Gvozdanović, J., Rijksbaron, A., & Vet, C. 1981. Predication and 
expression in Functional Grammar. London: Academic Press. 165-
184.
_____. 1997. The theory of Functional Grammar. Part 1: The structure 
of the clause. 2nd revised edition, ed. by Kees Hengeveld. Berlin: 
Mouton de Gruyter.
ESCRIBANO, J. L. G. 1992. El concepto de ‘modularidad’ en la teoría 
lingüística. Revista Canaria de Estudios Ingleses, 46: 25-43.
FODOR, Jerry A. 1983. The Modularity of Mind. Cambridge, MA: The 
MIT Press.
GARCÍA VELASCO, D. 2013. Raising in Functional Discourse Grammar. In: 
Mackenzie, J. Lachlan & Hella Olbertz (eds.) Casebook in Functional 
Discourse Grammar. Amsterdam: Benjamins. 249-276.
GARCÍA VELASCO, D., K. Hengeveld & J.L. Mackenzie, 2012. Epilogue: 
Dynamic morphosyntax in Functional Discourse Grammar. Language 
Sciences, 34: 491-498.
HENGEVELD, Kees & J. Lachlan Mackenzie. 2008. Functional Discourse 
Grammar. A typologically-based theory of language structure. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
JACKENDOFF, Ray. J. 1997. The Architecture of the Language Faculty. 
Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press.
_____. 2002. Foundations of Language. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press.
KROON, C. 1997. Discourse markers, discourse structure and Functional 
Grammar. In: Connolly, J. H., Vismans, R. M., Butler, C.S. & Gatward, 
R. A. (eds.), Discourse and Pragmatics in Functional Grammar. 
Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter. 17-32.
LANGACKER, R. W. 1987. Foundations of Cognitive Grammar. Stanford: 
Stanford University Press.
LEVELT, W. J. M. 1989. Speaking: From Intention to Articulation. 
Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
MACKENZIE, J. Lachlan. 2014. The Contextual Component in a dialogic 
FDG. Pragmatics, 24: 249-273.
NEWMEYER, F. 1998. Language Form and Language Function. Cambridge, 
MA: The MIT Press.




2017 Ana Carolina Vilela-Ardenghi & Ana Raquel MottaDaniel García Velasco
